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A FEAR OF COMMITMENT: THE SUPREME
COURT'S REFUSAL TO PRONOUNCE A
FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARD FOR
CABLE TELEVISION IN DENVER AREA
EDUCATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CONSORTIUM, INC. v. FCC
Since its inception in the 1950s,' the cable television indus-
try has expanded tremendously and now serves almost sixty
million subscribers.2 Congress began regulating the industry by
applying extant communications legislation before the first cable
television system was ever installed.3 Eventually, however, laws
specifically dealing with the cable industry were implemented.4
'See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161-65 (1968)
(discussing early development of cable television); JAMES W. ROMAN, CABLEMANIA 1
(1983) (explaining that precise date of origination of cable television is unclear).
' See Erik Forde Ugland, Cable Television, New Technologies and the First
Amendment After Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 60 Mo. L. REV. 799, 799
(1995) (citing BROADCASTING & CABLE YEARBOOK, vol. 2, xi (1995)). In 1965, less
than 2,000 cable television systems were in operation, but the industry was growing
rapidly. See Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 162.
' It is possible to trace federal regulation of cable television back to the Com-
munications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§
151-609 (1994). The 1934 Act created the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") "[flor the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in com-
munication by wire and radio...." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). Early in the development
of the cable television industry, however, the FCC failed to exercise its authority
over the industry and permitted local governments to monitor the industry. See
Toni Elizabeth Gilbert, Note, Economic Regulation of the Cable Television Industry:
Reigning In a Giant at the Expense of the First Amendment, 45 CATH. U. L. REv.
615, 634 n.108 (1996) (explaining that FCC declined to regulate industry because it
determined it lacked jurisdiction over cable systems under 1934 Act). The FCC in-
creased its regulatory authority over the industry after 1960. See Southwestern Ca-
ble Co., 392 U.S. at 165-67 (detailing early FCC regulations of cable television in-
dustry); Gilbert, supra, at 634 ("Until 1975, the FCC's primary concern was the
relationship between cable and broadcasting [but] as the industry grew ... the FCC
became more concerned with the emergence of cable as part of the national com-
munications structure and further entered the field of regulation.").
4 In 1984, Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
("1984 Act"). 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1994) (amended by Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460). The
purpose of the 1984 Act was to establish a policy of deregulation for the cable indus-
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Judicial review of these laws was usually confined to deciding
the scope of the Federal Communication Commission's ("FCC" or
"Commission") regulatory authority over the cable industry.5
With the passage of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 19926 ("1992 Cable Act"), Congress has
provided the judiciary with an opportunity to expand upon and
clarify the scope of cable television jurisprudence.
Among the Act's provisions is section ten, which vests cable
operators,7 rather than the FCC, with the power to refuse car-
riage of leased access' or public access9 programming that the
operator believes to be excessively sexually explicit or indecent.'0
try to encourage "growth and competition within the industry." See Gilbert, supra
note 3, at 634. The 1984 Act was the "first federal statute to establish a comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme for the cable industry." Community Television of Utah, Inc.
v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (D. Utah 1985). With the passage of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Act"), the fed-
eral government re-regulated the industry. Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); see Gilbert, supra note 3, at 615 ("[L]awmakers de-
signed the [1992] Act to correct market imbalances ... promote competition ... and
assure the survival of free, local television broadcasting.").
' See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 662-63 (1972)
(affirming FCC's jurisdiction over matters "reasonably ancillary" to broadcasting);
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 167 (noting that Court's inquiry is only into
FCC's regulatory authority and concluding FCC has jurisdiction over cable indus-
try).
6 Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
' "Cable operators typically own a physical cable network used to convey pro-
gramming over several dozen cable channels into subscribers' houses." Denver Area
Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2381 (1996).
8 Federal law requires a cable operator to reserve some channels, referred to as
"leased access channels," for commercial lease by third parties. See 47 U.S.C. §
532(b) (listing requirements for designation of channel capacity for commercial use);
see also David Ehrenfest Steinglass, Extending Pruneyard: Citizens' Right to De-
mand Public Access Cable Channels, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113, 1115 n.11 (1996) ("By
contrast with public access channels, cable operators charge programmers for the
use of leased access channels.").
9 Public access channels are channels that local governments require cable sys-
tems to reserve for public, educational, or governmental purposes as consideration
for the cable operator's use of the public streets to install cable. See 47 U.S.C. § 531
(authorizing franchising authority to establish requirements for use or designation
of public, education, or government channels); see also Steinglass, supra note 8, at
1115 n.11 ("[Public access channels] are made available to the public on a first-come,
first-served basis. Access channels have been set aside as a result of negotiations
between a local franchising authority and a cable operator bidding for a franchise to
operate a cable system within a community.").
'0 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, §10, 106 Stat. 1460, 1486 (1992) (entitling section 10 "Children's Pro-
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Congress enacted this section in an effort to prevent children
from viewing, on cable television, the same type of sexually ex-
plicit programming that had previously been barred from net-
work (or free) television." Specifically, Congress gave cable op-
tection From Indecent Programming On Leased Access Channels"). Section 10(a) of
the 1992 Act permits cable operators to refuse to carry leased access programming
which the operator "reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or excretory ac-
tivities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by contemporary
community standards." Id. § 10(a), 106 Stat. at 1486 (amending § 612(h) of the 1934
Act at 47 U.S.C. § 532(h)) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532(h)). Section 10(c), which is
similar to section 10(a) except insofar as 10(c) applies to public access channels, in-
structs the FCC to promulgate regulations that will "enable a cable operator of a
cable system to prohibit ... programming which contains obscene material, sexually
explicit conduct, or material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct [on public,
educational, governmental access facilities]." Id. § 10(c), 106 Stat. at 1486 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. 531 note). Section 10(b) of the 1992 Act authorizes the FCC to prescribe
rules that will require programmers to inform cable operators if the programming is
indecent under FCC regulations and to require "cable operators to place" such ma-
terial on a "single channel" and "to block such single channel unless the subscriber
requests access to such channel in writing." Id. § 10(b), 106 Stat. at 1486 (amending
§ 612 of the 1934 Act at 47 U.S.C. 532) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532(j)).
The FCC defined indecent material as descriptions or depictions of "sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by con-
temporary community standards for the cable medium." Implementation of Section
10 of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Indecent Pro-
gramming and Other Types of Materials on Cable Access Channels, First Report
and Order, 58 Fed. Reg. 7990, 7993 (1993). In 1993, the FCC released two Reports
and Orders adopting regulations to implement section 10 of the 1992 Act. See Im-
plementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992: Indecent Programming and Other Types of Materials on Cable Access
Channels, First Report and Order, 58 Fed. Reg. 7990 (1993) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. § 76.701(g)); Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992: Indecent Programming and Other Types of Materials
on Cable Access Channels, Second Report and Order, 58 Fed. Reg. 19623 (1993) (to
be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.702).
" The ban against obscene and indecent broadcast programs was originally
provided by the 1934 Act and the Radio Act of 1927. See generally JOHN R. BITMER,
LAW AND REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA 122-26 (2d ed. 1994) (detailing history
of Congress' regulation of indecent and obscene broadcasting programs). In 1948,
the ban was removed from the acts and was incorporated into the United States
Criminal Code section 1464, which states: "[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent,
or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994). Courts
have applied section 1464 to both radio and television. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731 (1978) (applying statute to radio broadcast); Gillett
Comm. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757, 762 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (applying
statute to television broadcast).
The authority to enforce section 1464 lies with the Department of Justice and
the FCC. The Commission's power is enhanced by the 1934 Act which gives the FCC
the authority to order a broadcaster to cease and desist from broadcasting indecent
or obscene material. 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1994). The FCC may also impose fines, 47
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (1994), or revoke or refuse renewal of the broadcast station's
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erators the power to restrict the content of some of the programs
carried on access channels, a power which may have significant
First Amendment ramifications.
12
Heretofore, the First Amendment implications of cable tele-
vision regulation had only received marginal attention from the
judiciary.13  Prior to 1979, federal courts had only tangentially
confronted the potential First Amendment issues.14 In 1979, the
Supreme Court for the first time addressed the possible First
Amendment implications of such regulations in FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp. 5 by noting that such claims were "not frivolous." 6
Following the Supreme Court's pronouncement, lower courts be-
gan to directly confront First Amendment issues raised by the
cable regulations.
In analyzing the constitutionality of the regulations, courts
first had to determine the appropriate standard of review. 8 De-
license. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (1994).
The FCC was later granted the power to ban obscene or indecent material on
cable television through the 1992 Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (j) (1994). Congress added
section 10 of the 1992 Act at the request of Senator Jesse Helms, who argued that
the leased channels on cable television contained various sexually explicit programs.
See 138 CONG. REC. S642-646 (1992) (statement of Sen. Helms). Senator Helms il-
lustrated his point by referring to the popular Robin Byrd talk show on New York
City leased access channels, on which guests strip and answer sexually explicit
questions. See id.
12 The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"3 See Steinglass, supra note 8, at 1138 n.132 ("Prior decisions by the Supreme
Court had skirted the issue of the constitutional status of cable.").
'4 See, e.g., Titusville Cable TV, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.2d 1187, 1189 (3d
Cir. 1968) (holding that rules which forbade cable television systems from carrying
same programs available on local broadcast stations did not violate First Amend-
ment on ground that such regulations were reasonable restraint designed to protect
public interest); Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(holding that distant signal rules do not violate First Amendment because such re-
straint was not more than was reasonably necessary to effectuate public interest).15 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
16 Id. at 709 n.19; see infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Century Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding must-carry regulations were not narrowly tailored to serve substantial gov-
ernmental interest and thus failed intermediate level of scrutiny); Quincy Cable TV,
Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1447-49 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (applying intermediate level of
scrutiny to analyze content-neutral government restrictions on speech).
"' See, e.g., Century Comm., 835 F.2d at 297-98 ("A threshold question for our
[F]irst [A]mendment analysis is what standard of review to apply."). In analyzing a
law that infringes on constitutionally protected speech or expression, the Supreme
Court must first classify the law as content-based or content-neutral. See generally
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2458-59 (1994) (noting distinction
between content-based regulations and content-neutral restrictions); Gilbert, supra
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spite several opportunities to do so, the Supreme Court consis-
tently failed to pronounce a definitive standard applicable to the
cable industry.19 This lack of guidance has resulted in skirmish-
ing among the lower courts for the appropriate constitutional
status of governmental regulation of cable television and its ef-
fects on the First Amendment. ° A resolution of this matter ap-
peared to be on the horizon in 1994, when the Court in Turner
Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC2 held that an intermediate
level of scrutiny was appropriate for the content-neutral "must-
carry"22 regulations of the 1992 Cable Act.2 ' Recently, however,
note 3, at 621-27 (examining applicable First Amendment standards for content-
based and content-neutral regulations); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983) (discussing content-based
and content-neutral distinction). Content-based regulations restrict speech based on
the message or idea conveyed. See Turner Broad., 114 S. Ct. at 2459; Karl E. Robin-
son, Comment, Content is in the Eye of the Beholder: The Supreme Court Upholds
the Constitutionality of the 1992 Cable Act's "Must-Carry" Provisions, 20 J. CORP. L.
691, 697-98 (1995). Content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny, the
highest level of scrutiny. See Turner Broad., 114 S. Ct. at 2459 ("Our precedents ...
apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or im-
pose differential burdens upon speech because of its content."); Robinson, supra, at
697-98 ("Content based regulations on free speech are subject to strict scrutiny, a
higher level of scrutiny than that applied to content-neutral regulations."). In con-
trast, content-neutral laws are not aimed at the content of speech and are analyzed
under an intermediate level of scrutiny. See Turner Broad., 114 S. Ct. at 2459;
Robinson, supra, at 698-700 (stating that lower standard of review is applied to con-
tent-neutral regulations that are not aimed at message of speech). A lower, defer-
ential standard of protection is afforded broadcasting, even in analyzing a content-
based regulation. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("[O]f all
forms of communications, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection."); Gilbert, supra note 3, at 628-32 (comparing lower scrutiny
standard of broadcasting with strict scrutiny of regulations of print media).
'9See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (highlighting Supreme Court
treatment of First Amendment in context of cable television).
20 See, e.g., Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, 600 (W.D. Pa.
1987) ("Cable television's physical intrusion into the public rights-of-way and the
ease with which operators are able to create a natural monopoly in a local market
have provided justification for governmental regulation."); Century Fed., Inc. v. Palo
Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1471 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (IIT]he characteristic in broadcasting
that justifies increased governmental intrusion in that medium is absent in [the ca-
ble context].").
21 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
Pursuant to sections four and five of the 1992 Act, cable operators are re-
quired to carry the programming of a specified number of local broadcast television
stations. Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-385, §§ 4, 5,
106 Stat. 1460, 1471-81 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 534-35). The number of channels a
cable operator must carry is determined by its capacity. See 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(A).
"Must-Carry" provisions were created to protect small local and regional broadcast
stations that might not be able to survive if unrepresented on cable systems. See
Turner Broad., 114 S. Ct. at 2454-55. "[T]he must-carry rules ensure that broadcast
1997]
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in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC,24 the Supreme Court rejected the opportunity to re-
endorse this standard and retreated to its earlier reluctance to
announce a First Amendment standard. The Court expressly re-
fused to decide the issue and narrowly decided the specific
claims before the Court. 5
In Denver Area, a group of cable television "access" pro-
grammers and organizations of cable television watchers peti-
tioned for judicial review of FCC orders implementing section 10
of the 1992 Cable Act.26 The group claimed that the three provi-
sions of section 10 and the FCC regulations implementing them
violated the First Amendment because the provisions restricted
the content of leased access channels by permitting cable opera-
tors to prohibit programming that they considered indecent.2 ' A
panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed
with petitioners and held that sections 10(a) and 10(c) were in-
consistent with the First Amendment.' The constitutionality of
television stations will retain a large enough potential audience to earn necessary
advertising revenue ... to maintain their continued operation." Id. at 2461.
23 Id. at 2469. In Turner, a number of cable television system operators and pro-
grammers challenged the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of the 1992
Act, which require cable systems to carry local broadcast stations. Id. at 2455. The
Turner Court concluded that the must-carry provisions were content-neutral and
therefore demanded an intermediate level of scrutiny applied under the O'Brien
test. Id. at 2469. The O'Brien test requires that a content-neutral regulation be sus-
tained if three factors are satisfied. First, the regulation must further an important
or substantial governmental interest; second, the governmental interest must be
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and third, the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms must not be greater than is necessary for the
furtherance of that interest. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Al-
though the Court found the government met the first part of the test by demonstrat-
ing the must-carry provisions served important government interests, the Court
lacked the facts necessary to complete the analysis under the O'Brien test. Turner
Broad., 114 S. Ct. at 2472. The Court's determination and application of a standard
was believed to be an indication the Court finally desired to directly address the is-
sue of cable television and the First Amendment. See, e.g., Ugland, supra note 2, at
800 ("Turner ... ends nearly half a century of reticence by the Supreme Court re-
garding the constitutional status of cable television.").
24 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
2 Id. at 2385 ("Rather than decide these issues [of the applicable standard], we
can decide this case more narrowly.....).
26 Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd
en banc, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff/d in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Den-
ver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
27 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2383. The group maintained that the requirements
of section 10 placed a burdensome restriction on the content of speech considered by
some to be indecent. See Brief for Petitioners, 1995 WL 763716.2 Alliance for Community Media, 10 F.3d at 831.
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section 10(b) was remanded to the FCC in light of the invalidity
of the other two provisions.29 Upon hearing the case en banc,
however, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding all three statu-
tory provisions constitutional." In a plurality decision, the Su-
preme Court reversed in part, holding that section 10(a) was
valid, while declaring the other two provisions violative of the
First Amendment.31
Writing for the plurality, Justice Breyer refused to apply a
categorical standard, such as those developed in analogous con-
texts, namely broadcasting and common carriers, to the area of
cable television.32 The Court maintained that there was no
"definitive choice" among the various First Amendment stan-
dards that would enable the Court to declare a "rigid single
standard, good for now and for all future media and purposes."33
Noting the rapid changes occurring in technology and the law of
telecommunications, the Breyer plurality felt "it unwise and un-
necessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of
words now."34 Although the Court was resolute in its refusal to
articulate a standard, the Court nevertheless applied a some-
what unprecedented test: the Court sought to "closely scruti-
niz[e] [section] 10(a) to assure that it properly addresse[d] an ex-
tremely important problem, without imposing, in light of the
relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction on
speech."35 The plurality, however, was unwilling to utilize this
test for the other two sections.3"
2id.
"Alliance for Community Media, 56 F.3d at 110.
"Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2398.
32 Id. at 2385 ("[N]o definitive choice ... allows us to declare a rigid single stan-
dard....").
"Id. The Court claimed that application of the categories used for common
carriers and bookstore owners would "import law developed in very different con-
texts into a new and changing environment, and they lack the flexibility necessary
to allow government to respond to very serious practical problems without sacrific-
ing the free exchange of ideas the First Amendment is designed to protect." Id. at
2384.
Id. at 2385.
Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2385.
"The Court did not articulate the "close scrutiny" test in its analysis of sections
10(b) and 10(c). In the Court's consideration of the constitutionality of section 10(b),
the Court did not apply only one formulation. Rather, the Court concluded the sec-
tion would fail both the strict "least restrictive alternative" test and the less strict
formulation of "not more extensive than necessary." Id. at 2391. The Court similarly
did not apply its "close scrutiny" test to section 10(c); instead, the Court's only
statement of the applicable standard was the Court's conclusion that the section
1997]
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy criticized the plu-
rality for failing to enunciate a standard applicable to cable
television.37 Justice Kennedy argued that because sections 10(a)
and 10(c) restricted non-obscene, indecent programming," a pro-
tected category of speech, on the basis of content, strict scrutiny
analysis should be the Court's starting point.39 In order to sur-
was not "appropriately tailored to secure ... [its] end." Id. at 2397.
3' Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2405-07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
began his dissenting opinion by arguing that:
[w]hen confronted with a threat to free speech in the context of an emerg-
ing technology, we ought to have the discipline to analyze the case by ref-
erence to existing elaborations of constant First Amendment principles.
This is the essence of the case-by-case approach to ensuring protection of
speech under the First Amendment, even in novel settings.
Id. at 2404. Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion emphasizes that the plurality re-
fused to apply strict scrutiny, yet it was compelled to apply some sort of standard-
whether the Act "properly addresses an extremely important problem, without im-
posing, in light of the relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction on
speech." Id. at 2406. According to Justice Kennedy, "Itihe words end up being a le-
galistic cover for an ad hoc balancing of interests." Id. at 2407.
38 Material that is found to be obscene has no First Amendment protection. See
Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) ("We have repeatedly
held that the protection of the First Amendment does not extend to obscene
speech."); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (reaffirming basic
holding of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) that obscene material is
not protected by First Amendment); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973)
(recognizing well settled principle that obscene material is unprotected form of
speech under First Amendment); Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (holding that "obscenity is
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press"). The test for ob-
scenity was articulated in Miller v. California as follows:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct spe-
cifically defined by the applicable state law; and c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). Sex-related materials which are indecent
but not obscene, however, are within a protected category of speech. See Sable
Comm., Inc., 492 U.S. at 126 ("Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene
is protected by the First Amendment."); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 213-14 (1975) ("Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some
other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from
images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.").
39 See Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2407 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The First
Amendment prevents the government from restricting speech or expressive conduct
because of the ideas expressed. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445,
2458 (1994) ("[The First Amendment ... does not countenance governmental control
over the content of messages expressed by private individuals."); Regan v. Time,
Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984) ("Regulations which permit the Government to dis-
criminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the
[Vol. 71:173
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vive strict scrutiny, the law had to address a "compelling
[government] interest" and had to be "narrowly tailored" to serve
that interest." Consequently, Justice Kennedy argued for the
use of a strict scrutiny test by analogizing cable operators with
common carriers.4 While Justice Kennedy acknowledged that
Congress had a compelling interest in protecting children from
indecent programming, he found that sections 10(a) and 10(c)
were not narrowly tailored to further that interest and therefore
failed to withstand strict scrutiny analysis.42
This Comment asserts that the Supreme Court in Denver
Area should have pronounced a First Amendment standard for
cable television in order to finally remedy the inconsistencies
among lower court analyses and decisions. Part I of this Com-
ment explores the Court's reluctance to set such a standard by
examining the Court's history of evading the establishment of a
constitutional standard for similar emerging technologies. Part
II examines the effect that the Supreme Court's lack of direction
has had upon lower courts. Specifically, it will be shown that the
lack of Supreme Court direction has led lower courts to focus on
the medium rather than the speech to which the restrictions
apply. It is asserted in Part III that such distinctions between
media infract important First Amendment principles. Finally,
this Comment concludes by proposing that the Court should
First Amendment.") (citations omitted). Laws which encroach upon First Amend-
ment protections by restricting the content of speech are to be analyzed under strict
scrutiny. See Turner Broad., 114 S. Ct. at 2459 (noting that Supreme Court has
consistently applied "the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disad-
vantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content"); see
also Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 124-25 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing application of strict scru-
tiny analysis to New York statute imposing severe restrictions on authors and pub-
lishers using content as its sole criterion); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)
(applying "most exacting scrutiny" to content-based restriction on speech directed
against foreign governments).
40 See Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2416 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Miami
Herald Pubrg Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (holding Florida law requir-
ing newspapers to allow response of criticized politicians was content-based and re-
quired that law be necessary to achieve compelling government interest and nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that interest).
" Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2411-15 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
posed the issue as whether strict scrutiny should apply to a law permitting a com-
mon carrier to exclude specified speech on the basis of content. Id. at 2412. Although
no existing case was directly on point, Justice Kennedy equated common carriers
with a traditional public forum, and therefore would subject the law to strict scru-
tiny. Id.
4 Id. at 2416-17.
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adopt the standards used in the print medium for analyzing
First Amendment violations in cable television.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S HISTORY OF AVOIDING THE ISSUE:
"WHAT STANDARDS APPLY TO NEW TECHNOLOGIES?"
When the Constitution was drafted to protect both the free-
dom of speech and of the press, the printing press was a
"phenomena of communications."43 While the drafters intended
to extend protection to this form of communication,' they never
could have envisioned the advanced forms of communication that
subsequently developed in order to expressly provide for their
protection. Accordingly, courts have had difficulty applying the
First Amendment to these new forms of communication.45
Historically, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to ex-
tend constitutional guarantees to new communication technolo-
gies.46 Yet, in situations where a new technology had integrated
itself into society, and had become mainstream, the Court slowly
extended First Amendment guarantees to the new medium and
thereby began to define the degree of protection the new medium
was to be accorded.47 For instance, when film was considered a
new invention, the Supreme Court refused to acknowledge the
industry as a form of communication deserving of full First
Amendment protections.48 Instead, the infant film industry was
viewed as "a business ... originated and conducted for profit ...
not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded ... as part of the
press of the country."49 Decades later, however, the Court re-
nounced its prior position by holding that "moving pictures, like
' Nichelle Frelix, Note, Turner Broadcasting v. FCC: Modern Comm. Develop-
ment and the Evolving First Amendment, 16 WHITrIER L. REV. 685, 685 (1995). See
generally Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking
the Cycle of Repression, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 264-65 (1994)
(examining expansion and regulation of printing press during its early years).
4'See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press....") (emphasis added).
4" Frelix, supra note 43, at 685.
4" See generally Corn-Revere, supra note 43, at 265-81 (discussing slow recogni-
tion of First Amendment status of new technologies by courts and policy-makers).
41 See id. at 275-76.
4 8See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Conm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915)
(noting lack of protection for film industry), overruled by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). See generally Corn-Revere, supra note 43, at 266-67
(discussing Court's first encounters with film industry and film's First Amendment
rights).
9 Mutual Film, 236 U.S. at 244.
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newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom
is guaranteed by the First Amendment.""
Likewise, with the advent of broadcasting, which encom-
passes both radio and television, the courts first refused to ex-
tend First Amendment protection to the new medium.51 Later,
when the Supreme Court finally recognized broadcasters' consti-
tutional rights, it applied a lower level of protection than ac-
corded the print medium because of broadcasting's seemingly
special characteristics.52 The Court highlighted both the scarcity
of spectrums ("scarcity" rationale)53 and the intrusive ability of
broadcasters to enter the home ("intrusiveness" or
"pervasiveness" rationale)' as justifications for restrictions on
5 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948); see also
Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 502 (overruling Mutual Film insofar as it denied First
Amendment protection to motion pictures).
6' See, e.g., Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850,
851 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (holding refusal to review broadcast license due to defamatory
material within scope of federal radio commission's power) See generally Corn-
Revere, supra note 43, at 266 (discussing unwillingness of courts to advance First
Amendment protections to broadcasting).
12 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (affording broadcast-
ing lower level of protection based on its uniquely pervasive nature and its broad
accessibility to children); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)
(noting that "differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in
the First Amendment standards applied to them").
6Justice Frankfurter first articulated the scarcity rationale in National Broad.
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943). The Court noted that since "the
radio spectrum simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody," regulation is
necessary to prevent interference between signals. Id. at 213; see also Red Lion, 395
U.S. at 386-90. The broadcasters in Red Lion alleged that the fairness doctrine,
which required radio and television broadcasters to present public issues on their
stations and to grant fair and equal coverage to each side of the issue, infringed
their freedom of speech and press. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386. Although noting that
broadcasting clearly implicates a First Amendment interest, the Court upheld the
regulations under the scarcity rationale. Id. at 388. The Court found that "[wlhere
there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are fre-
quencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish."
Id.; see also FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984). Although
the Court in League of Women Voters adhered to the validity of the scarcity ration-
ale in the broadcasting arena, it noted the rationale had been criticized due to ad-
vances in cable technology which have provided communities with a far greater
range of stations, thereby diminishing the doctrine's accuracy. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. at 376-77 n.11. Nevertheless, the Court refused to reconsider the
approach unless guided by Congress or the FCC. Id.
54 See e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. The Court relied on the pervasiveness of
radio and television in the home to justify allowing extensive regulations of
"indecent" broadcasts. Id. at 748-49. The Court likened the broadcast media to an
"intruder" into the home and thereby upheld the content-based regulations. Id. at
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otherwise constitutionally protected speech.55
Not suprisingly, the Court has shown a similar ambivalence
towards the First Amendment implications of cable television
regulation.56 After the Court's 1968 decision in United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co.,57 which affirmed the FCC's right to
regulate cable television, the FCC imposed extensive regulations,
covering various areas such as syndicated program exclusivity,
non-broadcast services, cross-ownership, and technical stan-
dards. 8 The regulations were guided by the FCC's fear that ca-
ble television posed a potential economic threat to broadcast
television.59 By 1977, the FCC began to relax cable regulations
following the decision in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,60 which
greatly limited the FCC's authority by declaring that the Com-
mission could not use its power to protect broadcasters. 61
It was not until 1979 in Midwest Video, however, that the
Supreme Court finally acknowledged the possible First Amend-
ment protections afforded cable television.62 Although the Court
removed much of the FCC's ability to regulate the cable televi-
sion industry, it still refrained from conducting extensive First
Amendment review; instead, the Court decided the case on
statutory grounds.63 Later, in Los Angeles v. Preferred Commu-
nications, Inc.,' the Court recognized that a local government's
grant of exclusive franchises implicated First Amendment inter-
748.
"s The First Amendment guards against government efforts to restrict speech
because of the message such speech conveys. Thus, regulations which restrict the
content of speech are subject to strict scrutiny. See supra notes 18 & 39. Certain
categories of speech, however, such as obscenity, do not garner First Amendment
guarantees and may, therefore, be constitutionally restricted. See supra note 38.
" See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
ambivalence).
5' 392 U.S. 157 (1968). Notably, the Court specified that the FCC regulations
had to be "reasonably ancillary" to its regulation of broadcasting. Id. at 178.
58 See BITTNER, supra note 11, at 261-62 (detailing early FCC cable regulations);
KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAw AND REGULATION 167-68 (1993)
(noting FCC increased cable regulation in 1970s).
'9 See CREECH, supra note 58, at 167 ("[Tlhe underlying premise of most of the
rules was the protection of broadcasters.").
60 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
61 Id. at 28-34; see also BITrNER, supra note 11, at 262 (stating that regulations
after 1977 were "patchwork legislation").
' See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 n.19 (1979) ("Because our
decision rests on statutory grounds, we express no view on [the question of First
Amendment rights], save to acknowledge that it is not frivolous ... ).
63 id.
476 U.S. 488 (1986).
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ests,65 but the Court again refused to advance a First Amend-
ment standard for the analysis of such interests.66 Finally, five
years later, in Leathers v. Medlock, ' the Court definitively stated
that cable television "is engaged in 'speech' under the First
Amendment, and is, in much of its operation, part of the
'press.'"6s The Court, however, failed to go further and abstained
from pronouncing a standard of scrutiny.69
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that First
Amendment constitutional protections extend to cable television,
the Court has repeatedly failed to determine the appropriate
level of protection to be afforded the industry.0 The Court's re-
luctance seems to stem from a fear that a decision today will be
determinative of the appropriate First Amendment standards for
future technologies.' This reluctance was clearly evidenced in
Denver Area, in which the Court, rather than committing itself
to one standard, utilized different standards in its analysis of the
three challenged provisions of the 1992 Cable Act.
In the Court's analysis of section 10(a), which permits a ca-
ble operator to refuse to carry leased access programming that it
"reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or excretory ac-
eId. at 494 (noting cable operator's selection of programming evidences edito-
rial discretion and is protected speech).
c6 Id. at 494-95. The Preferred Communications Court evaded the issue by stat-
ing:
Cable television partakes of some of the aspects of speech and the commu-
nication of ideas as do the traditional enterprises of newspaper and book
publishers, public speakers, and pamphleteers .... We do not think, how-
ever, that it is desirable to express any more detailed views on the proper
resolution of the First Amendment question ....
Id. Id 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
"Id. at 444.
"See id. at 448 ("[Tlhere is no indication that [the state] has targeted cable
television in a purposeful attempt to interfere with its First Amendment activi-
ties.").
70 See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
failure to set standard of review).
71 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374,
2385 (1996) ("[A]ware as we are of the changes taking place in the law, the technol-
ogy, and the industrial structure, related to telecommunications, we believe it un-
wise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of words
now.") (citations omitted); see also Corn-Revere, supra note 43, at 260 (forecasting
that "the outcome of the current controversy [concerning the standard for cable
television] will determine not just the First Amendment rights of cable operators,
but of all electronic publishers [and] likely will define the rules of the road for the
electronic superhighway").
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tivities or organs in a patently offensive manner,"72 the plurality
used close scrutiny.73 First, the Court noted that the govern-
ment's compelling interest in protecting children from exposure
to sex-related programming had repeatedly been accepted by the
Court.74 Next, the plurality noted that, but for previous acts of
Congress which required "must carry" and "PEG access" chan-
nels, cable operators could freely select the programming of the
cable channels they offered" even though once a cable operator
selected a programmer, it could not directly control the content
of the channel. Finally, the plurality acknowledged that the
problems addressed by, and the balancing of interests involved
in section 10(a) were analogous to the "indecent" radio broadcast
regulations at issue in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.76 In Pacifica,
the Court held that a restriction on "indecent" speech in broad-
casting was constitutional because the broadcasting medium was
"uniquely accessible to children" and had established a "uniquely
pervasive presence" in society.77 The Denver Area plurality not
72 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (1994).
73 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (quoting Court's "close scrutiny"
formulation).
74 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2386. The Court has often accepted the govern-
ment's interest in protecting children from exposure to sexually explicit material as
compelling. See Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
(recognizing government interest in protecting children from indecent material as
compelling interest); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968) (accepting
government's interest in shielding children from materials not obscene by adult
standards).
75 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2386.
76 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The competing First Amendment interests were those
served by the access requirements increasing programmers' access to means of ex-
pression and those of cable operators and other programmers to whom cable opera-
tors would have otherwise assigned the channels committed to access. See Denver
Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2386.
In Pacifica, the respondent's radio station broadcast a monologue by comedian
George Carlin, entitled "Filthy Words," at about two o'clock in the afternoon. Paci-
fica, 438 U.S. at 730-31. A man, while driving with his young son, heard the mono-
logue which contained profane language and complained to the FCC. Id. at 731. The
FCC later attempted to install a 24-hour ban on indecent material in broadcasting,
but the District of Columbia Court of Appeals declared the ban unconstitutional. See
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The FCC
then adopted a safe harbor regulatory policy which required that such programming
be aired only during the midnight to 6 A.M. time slot, a time when fewer children
would be in the broadcast audience. See CREECH, supra note 58, at 125-27
(discussing emergence of safe harbor rule).
77 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50 (noting difficulty of protecting viewers or listen-
ers from possible offensive material because warning may appear before viewer or
listener turns radio or television dial to offensive program and consequently render-
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only found that cable television possessed both of these charac-
teristics, 78 but it also declared that the permissive nature of sec-
tion 10(a) hampered less speech than the time restrictions at is-
sue in Pacifica.79 Accordingly, the Denver Area Court held that
section 10(a)'s restriction of patently offensive material on cable
television's leased access channels passed constitutional mus-
ter."
In contrast to section 10(a), the Denver Area plurality dis-
tinguished section 10(c) and chose not to utilize its "close scru-
tiny" test."' While the two sections are similar, section 10(c)
permits a cable operator to prohibit public access programming,
rather than leased access programming, that it believes
"contains obscene materials, sexually explicit conduct, or mate-
rial soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct . An important
distinction is apparently found in the fact that while cable opera-
tors have historically exercised editorial control over the leased
access channels regulated by section 10(a), they have not had the
same control over the public access channels affected by section
10(c).83 Instead, public access programming is normally subject
to supervision from public and private elements." Thus, a "cable
operator's veto" in public access programming will likely result
in the exclusion of marginal programs that the community con-
siders worthwhile and which the public access system encour-
ing warning ineffective since viewer or listener would already have been exposed to
material). In Pacifica, the Supreme Court held that a regulation barring indecent
non-obscene material on a radio broadcast was consistent with the First Amend-
ment. Id. at 735-38. Although the regulation was content-based, the Court did not
analyze the restriction under strict scrutiny; instead, the Court concluded that the
special characteristics of the broadcast medium required that more deference be
granted. Id. at 748-50. In an attempt to justify this deference, the Court noted that
"each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems." Id. at
748.
78 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2386-87. But see Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420
(11th Cir. 1985) (finding cable television is not as pervasive and accessible to chil-
dren as broadcasting medium); Community Television of Utah Inc. v. Roy City, 555
F. Supp. 1164, 1167-68 (N.D. Utah 1982) (noting differences between broadcast
television and cable television that justify difference in treatment).
79 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2387.
o Id. at 2390.
81 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing Court's analysis of sec-
tion 10(c)).
62 47 U.S.C. §531(e) (1994).
"Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2394-95.
"Id. at 2394-95 (exploring complex system of public, private, and additional
non-profit entities which set programming policies).
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ages and supports.85 Accordingly, the plurality did not accept the
government's contention that there is a problem of patently of-
fensive programming on public access channels significant
enough to support the restriction imposed by section 10(c)."8
Consequently, the Court declared section 10(c) unconstitu-
tional. 7
Unlike sections 10(a) and 10(c), section 10(b) did not merely
permit cable operators to restrict speech but, rather, it required
such restriction by the use of "segregate and block" requirements
for patently offensive sex-related material on its other cable
channels.88 The plurality found section 10(b) unconstitutional
because, given the other means available to and previously used
by the government to protect children from sex-related pro-
gramming, the "segregate and block" requirements did not
"properly accommodate the speech restrictions they impose[d]"
and were not "narrowly tailored" to further their objective.89
Hence, the Court concluded that the provision failed both strict
scrutiny and the less stringent formulation of "least restrictive
alternatives.""
II. THE RELIANCE OF LOWER COURTS ON MEDIUM-DEPENDENT
ANALYSIS
As the Supreme Court awaits the "proper" moment to enun-
ciate a standard of review for cable regulation, lower courts are
deciding First Amendment claims without guidance. Not sur-
prisingly, the Court's reticence has led to the development of an
irregular body of law, and lower courts have produced different
outcomes in similar cases. For instance, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California in Century
8Id. at 2395 (asserting that cable operator's ability to exclude marginal pro-
gramming is unnecessary in light of community involvement through access manag-
ers and supervisory boards in determining public access programming).
8' Id. at 2396-97.
87 Id. at 2397.
8' Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2390-91.
"9 Id. at 2391. Alternative, less restrictive methods available to the government
to protect children from "patently offensive" material on cable television include
"scrambling" and "blocking" such programming upon a subscriber's request, using
"lockboxes" that allow parents to "lock out" channels or programs they do not want
their children to view, and requiring manufacturers to make television sets with a
"V-chip'--a device that automatically identifies and blocks sex-related and violent
programs. Id. at 2392-94.
90 Id. at 2391; see supra note 36 (discussing Court's analysis of section 10(b)).
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Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto91 held that an exclusive fran-
chise arrangement that limits the number of cable operators in a
city violated the First Amendment.92 The court declared that
cable television, which does not have the problem of scarcity of
airwaves, was more analogous to traditional media than to
broadcasting, and therefore it is entitled to greater First
Amendment protection than is granted to broadcasting." In con-
trast, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Cen-
tral Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc.,94 held that
an exclusive cable television franchise similar to the arrange-
ment in Palo Alto did not violate the Constitution on the grounds
that the natural monopoly characteristics of cable television jus-
tified such a restriction.95
The inconsistency in results is best explained by the ten-
dency of courts to focus on the characteristics of the particular
medium by which speech is transmitted rather than the speech
itself. In assessing First Amendment claims concerning cable
television, courts have sought to determine whether the charac-
teristics of cable television are analogous to those of the printing
press,96 which has been granted the fullest First Amendment
guarantees, or those of broadcasting, 7 which has received less
protection.9 Courts have also considered whether the character-
9' 648 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Cal. 1986).92Id. at 1478-79.
93 Id. at 1471.
800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986).
9' Id. at 717.
' See e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974)
(applying strict scrutiny to state statute requiring newspapers to print political
candidate's reply to negative articles published by paper); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945) (applying strict scrutiny to government
regulation of press). See generally Keith A. Ditthavong, Paving the Way for Women
on the Information Superhighway: Curbing Sexism Not Freedoms, 4 AM. U.J.
GENDER & L. 455, 481 (1996) (explaining that printing press secures highest level of
protection).
97 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment
protection of broadcasting).
9" See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-28 (7th
Cir. 1982) (equating cable television with broadcasting); Home Box Office Inc. v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44-46 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (distinguishing cable from broadcasting and
recognizing that many standards applicable to print media might apply to cable);
Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1471 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(rejecting argument that cable television is analogous to broadcasting); Community
Television of Utah Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1167-69 (N.D. Utah 1982)
(distinguishing cable television from broadcasting and rejecting application of stan-
dards designed for broadcasting).
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istics of cable television require an entirely new analysis.99 Thus,
some courts have invalidated regulations on the basis that cable
systems are unlike broadcasting systems, °0 while other courts
have held that cable television and broadcasting share common
characteristics and should be similarly regulated.'' Still, other
courts have upheld regulations on the ground that cable televi-
sion is a natural monopoly. 2
See Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm., Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun expressed a medium-dependent ap-
proach for determining the appropriate standard for cable television:
Different communications media are treated differently for First Amend-
ment purposes. In assessing First Amendment claims concerning cable ac-
cess, the Court must determine whether the characteristics of cable televi-
sion make it sufficiently analogous to another medium to warrant
application of an already existing standard or whether those characteris-
tics require a new analysis.
Id. (citations omitted); Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)
("[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them."); Gilbert, supra note 3, at 627-28
(explaining that different levels of protection apply to media depending on specific
medium of communication). See generally Corn-Revere, supra note 43, at 268-87
(discussing classification of different media and various levels of protection attached
to certain categories). This medium-dependent varying standard approach was es-
tablished by a regulatory scheme, comprising the 1934 Act and the 1984 Act, which
define and categorize media of communications as broadcast systems, common car-
riers, such as telephone companies, and cable television. See Ditthavong, supra note
97, at 479-80. These categorizations and definitions of media have received different
levels of protection from the First Amendment. See generally Ditthavong, supra note
97, at 480-87 (describing First Amendment protections of different forms of media);
Gilbert, supra note 3, at 627-36 (describing varying levels of protection); Philip H.
Miller, Note, New Technology, Old Problem: Determining the First Amendment
Status of Electronic Information Services, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147, 1161-1189
(1993) (examining several rationales for government regulation of different media of
communication).
10' See, e.g., Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. at 1471. The district court in Palo Alto found
that the traditional justification for regulation of the broadcast media-physical
scarcity-is absent in the context of cable television and thus cannot justify in-
creased government intrusion in cable television. See id.; see also Cruz v. Ferre, 755
F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985). The Court of Appeals in Cruz rejected the application of
Pacifica's "intrusive" or "pervasive" rationale as a justification for extensive regula-
tions of "indecent" programming on cable television. Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1420-21; see
also Community Television of Utah, 555 F. Supp. at 1166-67 (explaining Pacifica
decision is inapplicable to cable television industry due to numerous differences be-
tween cable and broadcast television).
'' See e.g., Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 127-28. The court explained that cable
should be equated with broadcasting because both use public-rights-of-way. Id.
While broadcasting may be regulated because of its use of the public airwaves, cable
can be regulated because of its use of other public rights-of-way, such as telephone
poles and underground ducts. Id.
'02 See Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, 600 (W.D. Pa.
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III. DEFECTS OF A MEDIUM-DEPENDENT ANALYSIS
It is submitted that the medium-dependent analysis is
flawed and that the Supreme Court should take steps to end its
proliferation. A fundamental problem with the medium-
dependent approach is that it lacks "a consistent method of ap-
plication.""3 Courts are losing sight of First Amendment princi-
ples and are instead focusing on the mode of communication."
Another basic problem is that, as technology advances,"'5 courts
will have difficulty categorizing media and developing new stan-
dards applicable to each invention because complex technologies
may share certain characteristics but differ in other respects.'
1987) ("Cable television's physical intrusion into the public rights of way and the
ease with which operators are able to create a natural monopoly in a local market
have provided justification for governmental regulation."); Community Comms. Co.,
Inc. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981) (agreeing that cable
television's status as natural monopoly justifies reduction in protection).
103 Corn-Revere, supra note 43, at 287.
104 See Frelix, supra note 43, at 735 ("[Clourts are refraining from evaluating
how the regulations inhibit individual rights of speech, and are instead focusing on
the source which transmits the message. In doing so, there is a great likelihood that
free speech protections will be compromised."). Courts can avoid the complications
of media-differentiation by looking to First Amendment principles. Some commenta-
tors have suggested that:
[t]o overcome the media dependency dilemma, the courts should look to
First Amendment principles, and not allow technical advancements ... to
obscure its protective values. One of the most important values of the First
Amendment is promoting the flow of information. The First Amendment
accomplishes this by restricting government intervention in the production
and dissemination of information.
Ditthavong, supra note 97, at 488 (citations omitted).
'0' Technology that provides easy access to data and communication is expand-
ing. For instance, "local telephone companies, as well as private providers, will soon
be able to deliver a plethora of information services and video programming, using
various data formats such as voice, video, and text over telephone networks." Ange-
lyn M. Wright, Note, Indecent Exposure on the Information Superhighway: Regulat-
ing Pornography on Integrated Broadband Telecommunications Networks, 11 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 465, 465-66 (1995) (citations omitted). As technology advances, the
FCC develops methods of classification. For example, the FCC issues licenses for
services such as direct broadcast satellites (DBS), multichannel multipoint distri-
bution service (MMDS), operational fixed service (OFS), and instructional television
fixed service (ITFS). See Corn-Revere, supra note 43, at 287. Each of these sources
are classified differently in spite of similarities of function. Id.
"" One problem with-media differentiation is the difficulty in ascertaining the
similarities among media, such determinations tend to be subjective and prone to
disagreement. See Corn-Revere, supra note 43, at 287. Another difficulty is that a
particular medium may be similar to many forms of communication. Id.
Multimedia, for example, is "like" newspapers because it transmits text. It
is "like" books when presented over a personal player on CD-ROM. How-
ever, it is also "like" broadcasting or cable because it may transmit video,
1997]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
For instance, the differences between cable and broadcasting
have created problems in applying broadcasting standards to
cable television, despite the close similarities in projecting visual
programming to viewers. The primary difference between the
media lies in the manner by which each transmits its program-
ming..0 7 Broadcast systems send messages to viewers by trans-
mitting "electromagnetic signals from a central transmitting an-
tenna.""8 In contrast, cable systems, like telephone systems,
transmit messages via "cable or optical fibers strung above-
ground or buried in ducts to reach the [viewers].""9 Hence, the
cable industry is subject to government regulation because, like
telephone systems, they must request permission from local gov-
ernments to use the public rights-of-way."0 Another important
difference is that broadcasters provide their service at no charge,
while cable subscribers must pay a monthly fee in order to re-
ceive cable programming."' Both of these differences permit ca-
ble systems to provide subscribers with a greater variety of pro-
gramming because they are capable of transmitting more
channels than can broadcasting systems."' Accordingly, the ar-
gument that government regulation of broadcasting is necessary
due to the physical scarcity of radiowaves"3 can not be extended
to cable television because problems of frequency interference do
not arise with cable television.
14
Thus, by focusing on technical differences, courts utilizing
medium-dependent analysis will be forced to determine whether
such differences require the application of a different standard.
As a result, the rights afforded to categories of protected speech
are being diluted when courts afford less protection to the ex-
and it may be "like" common carriers when transmitted over the telephone
network. The philosophy that "differences in the characteristics of new
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them" is illogical in the case of multimedia.
Id. (citation omitted). Finally, it is suggested that a problem arises when judges ex-
amine and determine the issues regarding the similarities between media. Judges
are not experts in the field of technology and "can not be expected to keep up with
the mechanics of the field." Frelix, supra note 43, at 736.
'07 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2451-52 (1994).
108 Id. at 2451.
109 Id.
" Id. at 2452.
ill Id.
"2 Turner Broad., 114 S. Ct. at 2452.
'13 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
114 Turner Broad., 114 S. Ct. at 2452.
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pression based upon the medium by which it is transmitted."'
IV. PROPOSAL: APPLICATION OF PRINTING MEDIUM STANDARDS
TO CABLE TELEVISION
"At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that
each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs
deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence."116 This
principle is best served when restrictions on speech are lim-
ited.1 Doctrines and rules developed in the print medium re-
strain government regulation of the content of speech and pro-
vide for the fullest First Amendment protections. 8 In addition,
these rules allow for flexibility of application so that the exami-
nation of the regulations can include an analysis of the relevant
characteristics of the medium."9 For instance, a content-based
"s See Frelix, supra note 43, at 735 (explaining that First Amendment rights
are being compromised by media-dependent analysis). Speech that is broadcast has
garnered fewer protections because of the means of transmission, in spite of the
classification of the speech as protected. For instance, the Supreme Court declared
that newspaper publishers cannot be required to print the replies of those whom
they criticize because such restrictions are content-based and thus in violation of the
First Amendment. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244, 258
(1974). The Court, however, did not afford the same protection to broadcasters. See
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396 (reviewing right of reply requirements for broadcasting).
On the contrary, the Court required that broadcasters give reply time to political
candidates criticized during the course of their broadcast. Id. Similarly, the Court
allowed the FCC to prohibit the use of indecent language (that is not obscene) in the
broadcast arena despite its contrary holdings assigning constitutional protection
when published in newspapers. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49
(1978). If the Court did not differentiate between forms of communication, the
regulation would have been subject to strict scrutiny analysis and would most likely
not have passed constitutional muster. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying
text (describing different standards used for different means of communication).
"o Turner Broad., 114 S. Ct. at 2458; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
565 (1969) ("If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or
what films he may watcl").
17 See Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Re-
newing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Me-
dia, 104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1620 (1995) ("Though there are circumstances in which re-
strictions on expression are permissible, in general First Amendment values are
best served when such restrictions are kept to an absolute minimum.").
.. See Berman & Weitzner, supra note 117, at 1621 (explaining that print me-
dium is least tolerant of intrusive regulation); Gilbert, supra note 3, at 628
(explaining that "highest level of First Amendment protection has been afforded to
newspapers and other print media").I See Corn-Revere, supra note 43, at 310-11 ("[V]arious media may in fact have
different physical characteristics .... [tihese considerations may result in a some-
what different First Amendment analysis for each medium of communication, but
1997]
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regulation of the print medium is strictly scrutinized with a two-
part test: (1) whether the government has a "compelling interest"
in regulating the speech; and (2) whether the regulation is
"narrowly tailored" to further that interest.12
As the Supreme Court determined in Denver Area, cable
television possesses special characteristics in that it is "uniquely
pervasive" and "uniquely accessible" to children. 2' These two
factors are pertinent to the determination of whether the gov-
ernment has a "compelling interest" or whether the regulation is
"narrowly tailored." 2  Therefore, rather than passively allowing
they do not require different First Amendment standards."). See also JONATHAN W.
EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 128-29 (1991). Emord
proposes a "preservationist perspective," which is composed of two elements: static
barriers against government intervention and adaptive definitions for the terms
"speech" and "press." Id. at 128. Under this approach,
[amny effort by government to invade the private speech and press sphere
and to reorder existing relationships there will directly implicate the First
Amendment and must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. [The Adap-
tive Definitions] element is designed to prevent the amendment ... from
being construed to condone precisely that intervention into a new medium
that would clearly be unconstitutional were it to occur in an older print
medium. The Adaptive Definitions aspect ensures that the protection af-
forded the print media and face-to-face communication will apply to all
new media forms, guaranteeing that the Static Barriers remain virtually
impenetrable, high, wide, and thick despite technological evolution.
Id. at 128-29. This approach grants to other forms of communication the protections
given to the print media and allows the characteristics of such other media to be
taken into account under the "adaptive definitions" element.
120 See supra notes 18, 38-40 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
2 See Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd
en banc, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Den-
ver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996). The
court in Alliance applied strict scrutiny to section 10 of the 1992 Act. Id. at 828. The
court found that the FCC must offer evidence to assist the court in determining
whether leased access channels present a special problem of indecent programming,
thereby justifying the restrictive provisions of section 10. Id. at 829. According to
the court:
[The FCC] presents no evidence that indecent material on access channels
takes viewers by surprise in a manner that regular commercial program-
ming does not; there is no evidence that program guides are less helpful in
the access context; no evidence regarding the relative prevalence, or sever-
ity of indecent material on leased access versus regular commercial chan-
nels; and no evidence indicating that children are more frequently exposed
to indecent material on leased access channels than on regular commercial
channels.
Id. at 828. Essentially, the court sought evidence of the special characteristics of the
particular media, leased access channels on cable television, that would assist it in
applying a strict scrutiny analysis. The court remanded the issue to the FCC to ex-
amine the "relative prevalence and severity of and the relative exposure of children
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less First Amendment protections to be afforded speech because
of the means of communication, the Supreme Court should direct
the lower courts to apply the laws and doctrines developed in the
print medium context to cable television in order to protect im-
portant First Amendment principles and to achieve versatility.'23
CONCLUSION
An examination of the Supreme Court's decisions reveals the
Court's uncertainty regarding treatment of new communications
technologies and its reluctance to commit to a constitutional
standard for the new mediums of expression. The Court's failure
to declare the appropriate First Amendment standard for cable
television in Denver Area has injured First Amendment princi-
ples and has hindered the First Amendment rights of cable tele-
vision programmers. Lower courts are differentiating between
the mediums of expression instead of guaranteeing First
Amendment protections. The Supreme Court should offer guid-
ance to the lower courts and should direct their attention to the
characteristics of the speech itself, rather than the characteris-
tics of the mode of expression. This can be accomplished by ap-
plying the standards employed in the printing press context to
cable television. The Denver Area Court, by failing to pronounce
the appropriate standard, has merely prolonged the inevitable
and has permitted violations of First Amendment rights to pro-
liferate. The Court's continuous evasion of the issue is unac-
ceptable in a constitutional system in which citizens have struc-
tured their endeavors on the basis of their First Amendment
freedoms.
Diana Israelashvili
to indecent material on leased access channels." Id. at 829.
2' See Berman & Weitzner, supra note 117, at 1621 ("[T]he print medium [is] a
powerful demonstration of how to achieve diversity and limit government content
regulation."); James A. Bello, Comment, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC:
The Supreme Court Positions Cable Television on the First Amendment Spectrum,
30 NEW ENGL. L. REv. 695, 739 (arguing that "cable speech should not receive di-
minished protection and [that] restrictions on it should be treated in the same man-
ner as any other restriction on speech").
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